Paths in the development of elaborative discourse markers: Evidence from Spanish

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1. Introduction

Since the 1980s, grammaticalization has taken up an important place in linguistic research, and the term grammaticalization has come to be applied to a very large number of linguistic changes which include, apart from prototypical instances of grammaticalization such as the development of function words from content words, other more peripheral or even controversial cases, such as changes in word order (Heine, Claudi and Hünnemeyer 1991: 25, Haspelmath 2004: 26, 38), the development of discourse markers (DMs), or categorial changes like those undergone by the English to-infinitive (Los 2004, 2005) and gerund (Tabor and Traugott 1998: 240-244, Fanego 2004: 45-49), two forms which started as verbal nouns of action and evolved into parts of the verb system.

The focus of this paper is on the development of the Spanish manner adverbial de hecho ‘in practice’ into a DM roughly synonymous with English in fact and indeed. The view that the historical development of DMs has similarities with the developments taking place within the domain of grammaticalization was first put forward by Elizabeth Traugott in her groundbreaking article on the regularity of semantic change (1982) and was explored in greater detail in Traugott (1995, 2003), Tabor and Traugott (1998), Schwenter and Traugott (2000) and Traugott and Dasher (2002). In the two decades since Traugott’s initial work, research on DMs from the perspective of grammaticalization has multiplied; witness Jucker (1995), Brinton (1996), Onodera (2004), and Mosegaard Hansen and Rossari (2005), among many others. Yet with exceptions such as Garachana Camarero (1998), Pons Bordería and Ruiz Gurillo (2001) or Company Company (2004, 2006, 2008), the diachrony of Spanish DMs has attracted very little attention to date. One of the aims of this paper, therefore, is to examine the history of a Spanish DM whose English cognate, in fact, has been studied from both the synchronic (Oh 2000, Smith and Jucker 2000, Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2004) and diachronic (Schwenter and Traugott 2000) perspectives; synchronic descriptions of French en fait/de fait and Italian infatti are also available (cf. Danjou-Flax 1980, Roulet 1987, Rossari 1992, Jordanskaja and Mel’čuk 1995, Bruttì 1999). A second aim is to check whether the history of Spanish de hecho can help to confirm some of the hypotheses put forward by Traugott and her associates regarding the trajectories followed by DMs cross-linguistically.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines DMs; sections 3 and 4 give an overview of research on DMs from the point of view of semantic change and grammaticalization respectively; section 5 introduces the research questions that this study intends to answer and examines the functions and development of Spanish de hecho; section 6 closes the paper.

2. Discourse markers defined

It is notorious that DMs constitute a very heterogeneous group rather than a well defined word class, as is clear from the great number of different definitions and descriptive terms found in
the literature, such as *discourse particles* (Schourup 1985 [1982], Zwicky 1985, Fischer 2000, 2006, Aijmer 2002), *discourse markers* (Schiffrin 1987, Blakemore 2002), *discourse connectives* (Blakemore 1987: 104ff) or *pragmatic markers* (Brinton 1996). In this paper the label *discourse marker* will be understood in the restrictive sense it has in authors such as Fraser and Malamud-Makowski (1996), Traugott (1995, 2002: 154ff) or Fleischman and Yaguello (2004: 143), rather than in the broader sense initially proposed by Schiffrin (1987); in this restrictive use the term DM refers to a subset of a far larger set of pragmatic markers and comprises expressions whose function necessarily involves a relationship between two segments of discourse:

[DMs] are usually in initial position, although medial and final position are possible for many of them, and they signal how the utterance following (U₂) is to be interpreted, given the first utterance (U₁). […] The meaning of a discourse marker is procedural rather than representational, which means that it provides instructions to the hearer about how to interpret U₂ rather than designating a specific concept. (Fraser and Malamud-Makowski 1996: 864-865)

As Traugott and Dasher (2002: 152) put it, DMs are subjectified expressions

signal[ling] an aspect of the speaker’s rhetorical stance toward what he or she is saying, or toward the addressee’s role in the discourse. They have little conceptual semantics, and do not contribute significantly to the truth-conditional meaning of propositions […] they mark the speaker’s view of the sequential relationship between units of discourse, that is, they serve as connectives between utterances.

Some examples of DMs, all taken from Traugott’s work, include *so* in some of its meanings (e.g. “So, what’s for lunch?”); *anyway* as used in “anyway, probably the enemy is surviving on birds and squirrels”, where it is used to signal a return to a prior topic (cf. Tabor and Traugott 1998: 255, Traugott and Dasher 2002: 95); or *indeed* as used in (1), where it signals that what follows “is not only in agreement with what precedes, but is additional evidence being brought to bear on the argument” (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 164):

(1) 1630 Taylor, *Penniless Pilgrimage*, 131.C1 [Traugott and Dasher 2002: 165]: any a one that is not well, comes farre and neere in hope to be made well: **indeed** I did heare that it had done much good, and that it hath a rare operation to expel or kill diuers maladies.

The essential property of DMs, as defined above, is therefore that they have primarily *procedural* meanings (cf. Blakemore 1987, 2002). In this respect, they are to be distinguished from sentence adverbials (SAdvs), which include, among others, modality or epistemic adverbials (*probably, certainly*), evaluatives (*fortunately, regrettably*), and speech act adverbials (*frankly, briefly*). Unlike DMs, sentence adverbials have *conceptual* meaning, in the sense of Blakemore (1987, 2002); witness (2):

(2) A: **Sinceramente**, es una buena película.
   B: Eso no lo dices **sinceramente**, lo dices porque sabes que a mí me gusta.

   A: **Sincerely**, that’s a good movie.
   B: You are not saying that **sincerely**, you are saying it because you know that I like it.

The Spanish speech act adverb *sinceramente* does not impose additional truth conditions on its own clause, but its meaning is conceptual, rather than procedural, as shown by the fact that it is possible to negate that one is speaking “sincerely” (cf. Wilson and Sperber 1993, Martin Zorraquino and Portolés Lázaro 1999: 4058-4059). Apart from the semantic difference just mentioned, two additional differences between DMs and sentence adverbials have sometimes been pointed out in the relevant literature, one pertaining to morphosyntax, the other to intonation; they will be discussed in section 4 below.
3. Cross-linguistic regularities in the semantic development of DMs

In her seminal paper on the regularity of semantic change, Traugott (1982) put forward the hypothesis that there is a strong cross-linguistic tendency for semantic-pragmatic change to proceed along the path in (3), but not in the reverse direction:

(3) propositional > (textual >) expressive

This cline, which was based on Halliday and Hasan’s (1976: 26ff) proposal that there are three functional-semantic components or dimensions of language, namely the ideational, textual and interpersonal (= Traugott’s expressive) dimensions, has given way in Traugott’s more recent work to a more complex model of semantic change, labelled the Invited Inferencing Theory of Semantic Change (IITSC; see in particular Traugott and Dasher 2002: 34ff, also Traugott this volume: 23ff). This assumes several correlated paths of unidirectionality (see Table 1) and views pragmatic implicatures as playing a crucial bridging role in semantic change.

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Table 1. Correlated paths of directionality in semantic change (after Traugott and Dasher 2002: 40)

Traugott and Dasher illustrate these recurring patterns of change by examining changes in four different semantic domains, namely modal verbs, DMs, performative verbs, and social deictics. It is hypothesized that the regularities observed in these four domains “are major tendencies […] available for any kind of change that involves semantic development of at least those lexemes that are recruited to the target domains” (2002: 282) in question. With regard to DMs in particular, Traugott and Dasher (see also Traugott 1995, 2003; Tabor and Traugott 1998: 254ff; Schwenter and Traugott 2000) note that many of them have their source in VP adverbials which evolve into DMs, often via a sentence adverbial stage in which the adverbial has an adversative meaning or function. More specifically, based on the analysis of Japanese *sate* ‘so, well’ and of the English markers *indeed, in fact, actually* and *well*, Traugott and Dasher (2002: 177-281) propose that the development of DMs takes place along the various stages of development reflected in Table 2, each stage involving increased subjectivity and, ultimately, intersubjectivity, in the sense that the expressions in question gradually develop a semantic or pragmatic meaning primarily indexing speaker attitude or viewpoint (subjectivity) and speaker’s attention to addressee self-image (intersubjectivity).

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Table 2. Correlated paths of directionality in the development of DMs (after Traugott and Dasher 2002: 187)

Thus, in the case of English *indeed, in fact* and *actually*, three elaborative<sup>7</sup> DMs closely related to the Spanish adverbial which is the concern of this paper, Traugott and Dasher (2002: 157-175) show that all three items started as clause-internal adverbials, came then to function as...
epistemic sentence adverbials, and ended up as DMs, though *indeed (< Middle English *in dede* ‘in action, in practice’) developed DM uses around 1600, some two hundred years earlier than the other two items (cf. Traugott and Dasher 2002: 171). These various stages are outlined in the following paragraphs.

A) Stage I: *indeed₁ / in fact₁ / actually₁* = VP adverbials of respect or manner meaning ‘in action, in practice’. Certain discourse contexts could invite the inference that the event was observable, and the fallacy “seeing is believing”, which draws on the view that what is physically/empirically accessible is true, allowed the adverbials to be endowed with evidential (epistemic) modal meanings: ‘in action/practice’ > ‘in actuality, certainly’ (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 160). E.g.:

(4) c. 1300 *Fox and Wolf*, p. 34 [Traugott and Dasher 2002: 159]: “*Vuolf,*” quod þe vox him þo, “All þat þou hauest her before I-do, In þohut, in speche, and *in dede*, In euche oþeres kunnes quede. Ich þe for þewe.”

‘’Wolf,” said Fox to him then, ‘All that you have done before this, in thought, in speech, and **in action**, in evil of every other kind, I forgive you for it.’

(5) 1690 *Locke, Ess. Hum. Und.*, Bk. 2, Ch. 21, Sec. 36 [Schwenter and Traugott 2000: 15]: If we enquire into the reason of what experience makes so evident **in fact**, and examine why […]

B) Stage II: *indeed₂ / in fact₂ / actually₂* = epistemic adverbials with sentential scope often “serving a polyphonic adversative function” (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 171) and expressing commitment to the truth of the proposition (i.e. “It is true that…”, “the truth is that…”). E.g.:

(6) 1531 *Elyot, The boke named the gouernour*, p. 21 [Traugott and Dasher 2002: 163]: [teachers] somtyme purposely suffring ['allowing'] the more noble children to vainquysshe ['succeed, get the prizes'], and, as it were, guyung to them place and soueraintie, thoughe **in dede** the inferiour chyldren haue more lernyng.

(7) 1739-40 *Hume, Treat. Hum. Und.* Foot. 75, p. 510 [Schwenter and Traugott 2000: 18]: since the transition is in that case very easy from the small object to the great one, and should connect them together in the closest manner. But **in fact** the case in always found to be otherwise.

C) Stage III: *indeed₃ / in fact₃ / actually₃* = DMs with an elaborative function. At this stage the prime function of the adverbials is to signal additivity: what follows is not only in agreement with what precedes, but is additional evidence being brought to bear on the argument.

(8) 1630 *Taylor Penniless Pilgrimage*, p. 131.C1 [Traugott and Dasher 2002: 165]: any a one that is not well, comes farre and neere in hope to be made well: **indeed** I did heare that it had done much good, and that it hath a rare operation to expel or kill diuers maladies.

(9) 1886 *Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics*, chapter 1, p. 5 [Traugott and Dasher 2002: 168]: Thus in various ways ethical questions lead inevitably to psychological discussions; **in fact**, we may say that all important ethical notions are also psychological.

We can conclude this brief outline of Traugott’s approach to semantic change by drawing attention to its implications for current hypotheses about language change in general. Unlike generative models, which view language change as triggered by child language acquisition (see e.g. Lightfoot 1991), Traugott’s model assumes that many linguistic changes are not initiated by children, but rather by teens and adults, because of the complex inferences involved and the discourse functions in structuring text:
the model of acquisition assumed is one that does not privilege young children, but rather young adults […] and, especially in earlier times, those carrying the authority of education, law, or political or ecclesiastical and educational power. However, they may well be spread by children and younger adults, who pick up and extend innovations. (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 41-42; see also Traugott this volume: 25)

To have a full understanding of the changes discussed here and their impact on language-users, it will be important to know, among other things, in which text types particular changes are favored, and among which groups of people. For example, it has been suggested (Macaulay 1995) that English speakers in authoritative position, or those who position themselves as having authority, may favor stronger epistemic adverbials (e.g. in fact, surely) than others in less authoritative position. (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 283-284)

4. The development of DMs in relation to grammaticalization

In addition to the attention she has given to DMs within her IITSC model, Traugott has also looked at DMs from the point of view of grammaticalization studies. In her (1995) address to the 12th International Conference on Historical Linguistics (Manchester), as also in several later publications (Tabor and Traugott 1998, Traugott 2003, Brinton and Traugott 2005: 136-140), she has put forward the question of whether the development of DMs could or could not be included within the domain of grammaticalization. She aptly notes that SAdvs and DMs appear to undergo several of the morphosyntactic and semantic changes associated with grammaticalization (as outlined, for instance, in Heine, Claudi and Hünnemeyer 1991 or Lehmann 2002 [1982]: 108ff), such as decategorialization (loss in morphosyntactic properties characteristic of the source forms) or shift from more to less referential meanings. They do not, however, exhibit one of the syntactic parameters identified by Lehmann as also criterial for grammaticalization, namely condensation in structural scope, that is condensation in the extent of the construction which they enter or help to form, since both SAdvs and DMs have wider scope and relate to larger stretches of discourse than the VP internal adverbials which often are their sources, as becomes evident if one compares the VP adverbial in fact with the adversative SAdv (cf. (11)) and the elaborative DM (cf. (12)) that have evolved from it:


(11) 1739-40 Hume, Treat. Hum. Und. Foot. 75, p. 510 [Schwenter and Traugott 2000: 18]: since the transition is in that case very easy from the small object to the great one, and should connect them together in the closest manner. But in fact the case in always found to be otherwise.

(12) 1886 Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics, chapter 1, p. 5 [Traugott and Dasher 2002: 168]: Thus in various ways ethical questions lead inevitably to psychological discussions; in fact, we may say that all important ethical notions are also psychological.

Tabor and Traugott (1998) and Traugott (2003; also this volume: 11-12) therefore challenge Lehmann’s notion of decrease in structural scope as criterial for grammaticalization, and propose instead that in some change episodes, such as those involving the development of SAdvs and DMs from earlier VP adverbs, grammaticalization may involve increase in structural scope, rather than decrease. From this perspective, therefore, it is appropriate to consider the development of DMs and SAdvs from other parts of speech as “the legitimate object of study in terms of grammaticalization” (Traugott 2003: 643).

A different issue is how exactly SAdvs and DMs differ from each other. As noted above, both SAdvs and DMs exhibit increase in structural scope; they differ semantically, however, in
that the former encode primarily conceptual meanings and the latter procedural meanings (see section 2 above), but this criterion alone does not seem to be enough to argue that they involve different degrees of grammaticalization, since grammaticalization is a process generally understood to imply not just semantic/pragmatic changes but also structural and morphosyntactic ones. Witness in this respect various definitions of grammaticalization by Traugott and her colleagues:

In sum, we take the limits of the field of inquiry [of grammaticalization] to be **gradual morphosyntactic and semantic change** which results in grammatical reanalysis. (Tabor and Traugott 1998: 236; emphasis added)

Grammaticalization is **in essence a morphosyntactic phenomenon**, most crucially the development of functional categories (auxiliary, case, preposition, subordinator, etc.) out of constructions including lexical categories (main verb, nominal in adposition, etc.); it also involves intraconstructional fusion. (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 283; emphasis added)

In order for SAdvs and DMs to be recognized as separate formations, each worthy of consideration from the grammaticalization perspective, it should be possible, therefore, to identify in them distinctive structural properties. That such properties can be found has been claimed by Traugott:

most analyses of adverbials and pragmatic markers conflate the IPAdv [= SAdv] and DM functions. For example, Biber and Finegan in their seminal (1988) paper on “stance adverbs” conflate them as IPAdvs, Fraser (1988, 1990) conflates them as DMs. However, they are different syntactically, semantically, pragmatically, and intonationally. (Traugott 1995: 6).

Statements to the same effect can be read in Tabor and Traugott (1998: 253-257), Schwenter and Traugott (2000: 13, 21), Traugott and Dasher (2002: 158-159) and Traugott (2003: 639-640). More specifically, Traugott notes two main structural differences between SAdvs and DMs, one having to do with morphosyntax, the other with intonation. From the point of view of morphosyntax, based on work by Kiparsky (1995) on Proto-Germanic and Aissen (1992) on Mayan, Traugott claims that in generative terms SAdvs like *perhaps* or adversative *in fact* and *indeed* are sisters of IP (Inflection Phrase), whereas DMs occupy an outer position and “have syntactic properties in common with the left-most ‘E-node’ posited for […] external topics in Mayan”

(13)

To illustrate these differences, Traugott draws attention to examples like (14), where the SAdv *indeed* “is found in clause-initial post-Complementizer position as a contrastive adverb”, and (15), where the elaborative DM *indeed* occurs “in clause-initial, pre-Complementizer position” (Traugott 2003: 640):
(14) 1531 Elyot, The boke named the gouernour, p. 21: [teachers] somtyme purposely suffring ['allowing'] the more noble children to vainquysshe ['succeed, get the prizes'], and, as it were, gyuyng to them place and soueraintie, thoughg in dede the inferior children haue more lernyng.

(15) 1665 Hooke, Micrographia, 135: thereby [the flea] is inabled to walk very securely both on the skin and hair; and indeed this contrivance of the feet is very curious, for performing both these requisite motions.

As is clear from (15), Traugott adopts the X-bar analysis of phrase structure which assumes that main, non-dependent clauses contain an empty Complementizer constituent. Examples which reflected more clearly the different structural positions occupied by SAdvs and DMs would have been desirable, and the fact that Traugott does not adduce them, neither for indeed itself nor for its close synonym in fact, suggests that none could be found in her corpus material. On the other hand, she has acknowledged in other places that “the syntactic positions of in fact2 and in fact3 overlap” (Schwenter and Traugott 2000: 13), and recent analyses of in fact in Present-day English (Oh 2000, Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2004) show its great positional mobility as both a SAdv and a DM, and also its very frequent occurrence in medial position when used in DM function. More specifically, Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen raise doubts concerning Schwenter and Traugott’s analysis of in fact2 (the adversative adverb) and in fact3 (the DM) as “distinct polysemies, rather than contextually-bound uses of a monosemous lexical item” (2000: 21); they argue instead that from a synchronic point of view in fact2 and in fact3 can best be seen “as pragmatic implicatures which are conventionalised to a greater or lesser extent, as some contextual meanings are more frequent and more conventionalised than others” (Aijmer and Simon-Vandenbergen 2004: 1788).

All this suggests, I believe, that unless there exists clear supporting evidence, one should be wary of claiming that all SAdvs and DMs differ in terms of syntactic scope and distribution, though it is true that in the case of some DMs deriving from earlier SAdvs this claim appears to be justified, as happens with the topic-resuming DM anyway versus the concessive SAdv anyway ‘nonetheless’. These two uses can be kept apart not only semantically and pragmatically but also positionally (see Ferrara 1997): the DM is always sentence-initial, whereas the SAdv appears to be restricted to the right periphery of the VP; witness (16)-(17):

(16) They got up early. That’s rare for them. Anyway, they left at noon.

(17) It was ugly but he wanted to buy the dog anyway.

The fact that anyway, in fact or indeed do not behave alike syntactically need not be considered surprising if we recall that, as was pointed out in the opening lines of section 2, DMs constitute a very heterogeneous class, not only in terms of their sources –many English DMs, such as yes, oh, ok, as you know, I mean, hark ye, etc., do not originate in other adverbials– but also in terms of their functional properties.

Turning now to the question of whether there exist prosodic differences between DMs and the corresponding SAdvs, Traugott (1995: 6) and Tabor and Traugott (1998: 255) rely on Ferrara’s above-mentioned analysis of anyway (1997: 356), which shows that in Texas English this adverb carries a special intonation contour when used as a DM, to argue that SAdvs and DMs differ intonationally; see in this connection the quotation from Traugott (1995: 6) cited earlier in this section. In more recent work, however, Traugott appears to have changed her views, to judge at least from the following observation:

Out of context, the written form In fact, humanity is usually absent is ambiguous: it could evoke either adversativity to or an elaboration of something that preceded. In speech, in fact in both meanings [i.e. SAdv and DM] may have a typical disjunct intonation with a sharp rise and fall (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 158).
In addition, it should be pointed out that Wichmann, Simon-Vandenbergen and Aijmer (this volume) have reached inconclusive results regarding the extent to which the different prosodic realizations of English *of course* correlate with its uses as epistemic adverbial and DM. Thus they note (p. 24) that “despite the evidence for a relationship between stress and semantic weight, […] there are other parameters e.g. information status and pragmatic function, that make it impossible to expect a one-to-one relationship between prosodic realisation and any one parameter”.

5. *Spanish de hecho*: historical development and present-day usage

5.1 Research questions

Bearing in mind the various issues mentioned in sections 3 and 4 with regard to the cross-linguistic development of DMs and their relation to grammaticalization, the present study attempts to answer the following research questions:

(i) Is the development of *de hecho* ‘in fact, indeed, actually’ analogous to that of English *in fact* and other related DMs? Which functions, if any, do they have in common?

(ii) Is there any morphosyntactic evidence correlating with the semantic-pragmatic changes undergone by *de hecho* which might justify an analysis in terms of grammaticalization?

(iii) What kinds of text-types favour the use of *de hecho*? What is the role of generic conventions in change? Recall in connection with this Traugott and Dasher’s observations (2002: 41-42), quoted at the end of section 3 above, on the role played in language change not only by children but also by teens and adults.

5.2 The corpus

The diachronic analysis of *de hecho* is based on data from the Real Academia Española’s CORDE (“Corpus Diacrónico del Español” [‘Diachronic Corpus of Spanish’]). This database is accessible at http://www.rae.es and consists of approximately 196 million words of European Spanish covering from c. 1200 till 1975; eighty-five per cent of this material is prose and the rest verse. The synchronic data were retrieved from CREA (“Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual” [‘Reference Corpus of Present-day Spanish’]); this too is accessible at http://www.rae.es and comprises both written (85 million words) and spoken (4.5 million words) European Spanish dating from the period 1975-2000. Varieties of Spanish used outside Spain are also extensively represented in both CORDE and CREA, but have not been included in the analysis.

Throughout the rest of the discussion the ascription of linguistic examples to a given text type is based on the classifications provided by CORDE and CREA.

5.3 *De hecho* in Present-day Spanish

Though synchronic approaches to Spanish pragmatic markers are very numerous, not much has been written on *de hecho*, apart from a few passing comments in Martín Zorraquino and Portolés Lázaro (1999: 4141-4142) and a short article by Fuentes Rodríguez (1994) where she compares *de hecho* with the SAdvs *en efecto* and *efectivamente* ‘indeed’.

Like its English (*in fact*), French (*de fait/en fait*) and Italian (*infatti*) cognates, *de hecho* is today an idiomatic unit. It can often be found functioning at the VP level as an adverbial of manner (henceforth *de hecho*), with the meaning ‘in practice, de facto’; in this use it tends to occur in opposition to *de derecho* ‘according to law, with legal sanction, rightfully’, but other collocations are also possible, as is the case in (19), where *de hecho* contrasts with *con garantías* ‘with assurance’:
‘I would like to publicly express here,’ he later stated, ‘on behalf of my fellow countrymen and myself, our appreciation for the support and encouragement that we have always found in Luxemburg to form part, by right, of this Europe to which, de facto / in practice, we already belong.’

In addition, de hecho occurs very frequently as an elaborative DM (henceforth de hecho) which signals, like English in fact, or some uses of French en fait (Rossari 1992: 153-154), that “what follows is a stronger argument than what precedes, with respect to the speaker’s rhetorical purpose at that point in the discourse” (Schwenter and Traugott 2000: 12); its prime function is to signal additivity (i.e. ‘what’s more’) and to elaborate on the previous utterance. Examples of this use, by far the most common one in the spoken component of CREA, are given in (20)-(21):12

(20) CREA (spoken) 1996 Estadio dos, 06/10/96, TVE 2 [1. TV and Radio (Sports Report)]:

El partido fue igualadísimo hasta el descanso, de hecho al descanso se llegó con empate a dos.

‘The game was neck and neck up to half-time, in fact at half-time the score was two all.’

(21) CREA (spoken) 1996 Grupo G 4: Sociología [2. Other recordings]: A: ¿Y en el trabajo has aprendido algo en especial?

B: Sí, bueno, muchos idiomas, bastantes, de hecho, hablo seis y de los cuales cuatro más o menos, bastante bien,

‘A: And have you learned anything in particular at work?

B: Yes, well, many languages, lots, in fact, I speak six and at least four of them pretty well,’

As pointed out by Fuentes Rodríguez (1994: 7; see also Fuentes Rodríguez 1996: 43, 2003: 67-68), de hecho can also be employed as “un adverbio oracional con valor modal […] cercano a en realidad” (‘a sentence adverb with modal meaning […] very similar to in reality’). In this use de hecho is roughly synonymous with English in fact and most uses of French en fait (Danjou-Flaux 1980: 133), has strongly epistemic meaning and occurs in adversative contexts of various kinds, with “adversativity” being understood as “contrast between different points of view as these are constructed in language use” (Schwenter 1999: 127). See (22)-(23):

(22) CREA (written) 1998 Several authors, Filosofía. 1º bachillerato. Anaya, 160 [0.2 Social sciences (Philosophy)]: Se conoce como determinismo la teoría que niega la realidad de la libertad: aunque nos pueda parecer, a causa de un conocimiento insuficiente, que nuestras acciones son libres, de hecho no lo son.
‘Determinism is understood as the theory that disputes the existence of free will: even though it may seem to us, because we lack sufficient knowledge, that our actions are free, in reality they are not.’

(23) CREA (spoken) 1996 *Esta noche cruzamos el Mississippi*, 21/10/96, Tele 5 [1. TV and Radio]: ... se especula sobre otra cuestión, que dentro de un año vuelven otra vez a casarse. [...] parece ser [...] fue el propio Rainiero quien ratificó los papeles, fue él quien presionó a las altas estancias [sic] también jurídicas de ahí de Mónaco, para que el día cuatro [...] pues se ratificase directamente este divorcio. Y de hecho, ya digo, es un divorcio de cara a la galería, puesto que ellos se siguen viendo.

‘There is speculation about something else, that within a year they will remarry each other. [...] it seems [...] it was Rainiero himself who pressured the high courts there in Monaco, to on the fourth [...] directly ratify the divorce. And [i.e. ‘but’] in fact, you’ll see, it’s a divorce playing to the gallery since they are still seeing each other.’

I will refer to this strongly epistemic use of *de hecho* as *de hecho*$_{\text{2Adv}}$, so as to distinguish it from the sentence adverbial exemplified in (24); this will be identified henceforth as *de hecho*$_{\text{2Conf}}$ (for ‘confirmatory’):

(24) CREA (written) 1997 *El País*, 24/09/1997: *Termina en Zaragoza el conflicto del transporte escolar* [0.2 Social sciences (Education)]: La ministra de Educación, Esperanza Aguirre, ya vaticinó el martes en Radio Nacional que los problemas de Zaragoza se solucionarían en breve y, de hecho, así ha sido.

‘The Minister of Education, Esperanza Aguirre, already predicted on Tuesday on National Radio that the problems in Zaragoza would soon be solved and so they have been indeed. [or: ‘and indeed that has been the case.’]

In this type of context, which is not adversative or contrastive, *de hecho* cannot be felicitously replaced by *en realidad* ‘in reality’; its function is rather to signal agreement and confirm a preceding utterance, so that its closest synonyms in Spanish would be *en efecto* and *efectivamente* ‘indeed’. These are weakly epistemic adverbials used “for confirmation” (Bolinger 1950: 349; see also Barrenechea 1979: 54-55, Fuentes Rodríguez 1994: 12, Martín Zorraquino and Portolés Lázaro 1999: 4148-4149); cf. (25):

(25) *Prometió que llegaría temprano y en efecto llegó a las seis.*

‘He promised to come early, and he did show up around six.’

According to Bruzzi (1999: 520-521, 529), “displaying agreement with what has been stated before” is precisely the main use of Italian *infatti*, English *in fact*, by contrast, cannot signal agreement to a prior utterance or implicature (cf. Traugott and Dasher 2002: 171) and thus differs from *indeed*, which, as noted by Blakemore (2002: 97) and Traugott and Dasher (2002: 164, 171), is often confirmatory. E.g.:

(26) A: Do you agree?
    B: Indeed I do.

This section has looked at the main uses of *de hecho* in Present-day Spanish; they were found to have much in common with the functions reported in the relevant literature for its English, French and Italian cognates, as might have been expected in view of the fact that all of them go back, ultimately, to the Latin noun *factum* ‘deed, action’. The stages in the development of *de hecho* from its original function as a VP adverbial of manner into a DM are the concern of the next section, while the question of what is the best analysis, from a synchronic point of view, for its various uses today will be discussed in section 6 below.
5.4 Historical development of de hecho

The noun hecho ‘deed, action’ is recorded in Spanish from the earliest written documents. Its ancestor, Lat. factum, was sometimes used to denote ‘a real happening, a fact’, as opposed to fiction, as in (27); the evidential meaning that marks some uses of Sp. de hecho, Eng. in fact, Fr. en fait/de fait and It. infatti was, therefore, already a feature of their common Latin source.

(27) Petronius Arbiter 76.4 [OLD s.v. factum 3]: omnes naues naufragarunt, factum, non fabula.
‘All ships sank, in fact, not in fiction.’

5.4.1 De hecho as a VP adverbial of manner

From around the middle of the thirteenth century the noun hecho can be found preceded by the preposition de ‘of’ functioning as a VP adverbial of manner meaning ‘in action, in practice, in actuality’. It may occur on its own, as in (28), or in combination with other prepositional phrases more or less formulaic in character, such as de voluntad ‘in thought’, de dicho ‘in word’, or de palabra ‘in word’:

(28) CORDE 1293 Anonymous, Castigos, fol. 116R [14. Didactic prose (Gnomic literature)]: los omnes quando los lleua el prinçipe con braueza o del todo quebrantan contra el prinçipe o nonle Son bien obedientes E así lo prouamos muchas vezes de fecho que por que algunos prinçipes quesieron mucho abaxar sus subditos ouieron de ser Rebeldes contra los prinçipes

“Men, when their prince wields his rage at them, either rebel entirely against him or are disobedient to him. We have proven this many times in practice observing that because some princes wished to completely humiliate their subjects [the latter] had to become rebels against their princes.”

(29) CORDE 1256-1263 Alfonso X, Siete Partidas, fol. 19r [10. Documents and laws]: todos los xpistianos le deuen onrrar y amar en estas tres maneras. de uoluntad. and en dicho. and en fecho. En la primera que es de uoluntad […]. La segunda que es por palabra; quel deuen onrrar. llamandol padre sancto and sennor. La tercera que es de fecho; que quando algunos uinieren a el; quel besen el pie. and quel onrren en todas cosas;

“all Christians must honour and love him [i.e. the Pope] in these three ways: in thought, and in word, and in action. The first way is in thought […]. The second is in word, that they must honour him calling him Holy Father and Lord. The third is in action, that when they come close to him, they must kiss his foot and honour him in every respect;”

In the kind of context shown in (29) de hecho continues some of the uses of Lat. factum, which was often opposed to words; cf. ACC.trag.47 “dicta factis discrepant” (OLD s.v. factum n. 1.b).

A similar use has been reported for Middle English in dede (> PDE indeed), as can be seen in (4) above, repeated here for ease of reference:


‘Wolf,’ said Fox to him then, ‘All that you have done before this, in thought, in speech, and in action, in evil of every other kind, I forgive you for it.’
However, by far the most frequent collocation of de hecho in Medieval Spanish is forming a contrast set with de derecho ‘de jure, according to law, with legal sanction, rightfully’, as in (30) below. The earliest occurrence of de hecho in this use is in the Siete Partidas, the work where King Alphonso X (1252-1284) codified Spanish law following the principles of Roman law and, specifically, of the Corpus Iuris Civilis of Emperor Justinian (527-565) (cf. Kabatek 2001). The Siete Partidas formed part of a vast programme of translations of legal, historical and scientific works which were supervised by the Royal Chancery and marked the beginnings of the use of the vernacular for subjects that formerly had been written in Latin or Arabic (Fisher 1986; Fernández-Ordóñez 2004: 386ff).

(30) CORDE 1256-1263 Alfonso X, Siete Partidas, fol. 97r [10. Documents and laws]: E ninguna destas cosas spirituales sobredichas [...] no las pueden uender de derecho cuemo que algunos las compran y venden de hecho, que es symonia

“And the spiritual things above-mentioned [...] cannot be sold de jure though some buy them and sell them de facto, which is simony”

In this legal use de hecho can be glossed as ‘in action, in practice, in actuality’, just like in (28)-(29) above, but carries the strong additional implication that the action being referred to is done without legal sanction and/or by force. This polysemy allowed de hecho to occur in coordination not only with manner adverbs having evidential meaning such as realmente ‘in a real manner’,14 but also with adverbs and adverbial expressions like yjustamente ‘unjustly, illegally’ or por fuerça ‘by force’. Examples of such coordinate structures in CORDE include realmente and de hecho ‘in a real manner and de facto’, de hecho y sin ficción alguna ‘in actuality and not fictitiously’, de facto e yjustamente ‘de facto and unjustly’ and de facto o por fuerça e non por via de juysio ‘de facto or by force and not through legal means’; see also (31)-(32). In most of these cases it is difficult to tell whether the intended meaning was primarily ‘in actuality’ or ‘illegally’ or both.

(31) CORDE 1398 Carta de entrega de posesión [10. Documents and laws]: ... que agora ellos ponían and posieron luego al dicho abat, en nonbre de si and del dicho prior and conuento del dicho monesterio, en posesión pacífica, realmente and de hecho de los dichos sus bienes todos and de cada vno dellos,

“... that now they placed and did place the abbot in question, on his behalf and that of the said prior and convent of the said monastery, in the undisputed possession, in reality and de facto of each and everyone of the said goods,”

(32) CORDE 1483 Petición de traslado [10. Documents and laws]: E puesto que lo oviera prendido dentro en el termino e juredicion del dicho valle dicho tenia que, sy lo fiziera para lo llevar e lo llevara a la dicha villa de Castro se fazia e fiziera de hecho e yjustamente, e que no cabsara derecho alguno

“And even though he had detained him within the boundary and jurisdiction of the said valley, it was considered that, if he did it to take him and he took him to the said town of Castro, that was done and would be done de facto [i.e. illegally] and unjustly, and would entitle him to nothing”

In early Medieval Spanish de hecho usually follows the verb, as is the case in the above instances, where the higher verbs are respectively ponían and posieron and se fazia e fiziera. From the fourteenth century, however, we come across examples in which de hecho is given front position in the clause; thus between 1350 and 1400 CORDE contains 33 occurrences of de hecho on its own, that is, not coordinated to another adverbial; 23 of these occurrences follow the verb group and 10 precede it (two ex. in verse), as in (33)-(34):
“since you know that this man who has come to you is bound [by feudal law] to your enemy and that as a consequence he and all his lineage are your enemies, I advise you not to accept him in any way as a member of your retinue, because it is evident that he has come only to deceive you and to cause you harm. But if he is willing to serve you [even though] being far away from you, in such a way that he can neither harm you nor know anything about your affairs, and de facto [illegally?] causes so much harm and such dishonour to your enemy to whom he has feudal obligations, so that you plainly see that he no longer has occasion to reconcile with him, in that case you can trust him,”

“the Lacedaemonians were offended by Agesilaus, because such a city [i.e. Messenia] and so important which they possessed in years’ past was lost during Agesilaus’ reign. And for that reason [although the Thebans offered peace] Agesilaus resisted giving jurisdiction to those [i.e. the Thebans] who de facto had it. But he was unable to recover it [Messenia], and was in danger of losing all of Sparta.”

A common assumption is that leftward movement, manifested for instance in the increased use of a linguistic element in preposing and topicalization, constitutes evidence of subjectification; thus Torres Cacoullos and Schwenter (2006: 356-357) suggest that the development of Medieval Spanish pesar de ‘regret of’ into the concessive connective a pesar de que ‘in spite of (that)’ is manifested, inter alia, in the increased use from the eighteenth century onwards of the a pesar de phrase in a position preceding the main verb (e.g. A pesar de estas reflexiones, no estaba tranquilo ‘in spite of these reflections, he wasn’t tranquil’); see also Fischer (2007: 259 ff) and Traugott (this volume) for similar observations. The preposing of de hecho from about 1330 might thus be a genuine indication of widening of predicational scope and hence of the acquisition of epistemic meanings. Yet it should be noted that in most of my early examples the location of de hecho clause-initially seems to respond, primarily, to a desire of underlining the contrast between what is done according to law, and what is done without legal sanction or by force; note in this connection the choice of legal terminology like adebdado ‘bound by feudal law’, debdos ‘feudal obligations’, or jurisdicçion ‘jurisdiction’, which all suggest that in (33) and (34) de hecho largely retains its original, source meaning (for this label see Heine 2002: 84).

In addition to frequent preposing, another interesting development taking place from about the late fourteenth century is the very frequent use of de hecho in the second of two clauses
linked by *e/y* ‘and’ or *como* ‘as’; the second clause contains the same verb as the first and confirms or repeats its information:

(35) CORDE 1464 Anonymous, *Carta de apeamiento*. Documentación medieval de la cuadrilla de Salvatierra, 354 [10. Documents and laws]: … nin podiesen pidir anulação nin reçesion deste dicho contracto […] nin de cosa algunha de lo en el contenido […]. E caso que lo contrario dello quisesen o tentasen fazer e fiziesen de facto, que les non valiese nin fuesen […] oydos sobrello en juyzio nin fuera de juyzio ante algund juez eclesiastic nin seglar.

“nor could they ask for the cancellation or rescission of the contract in question […] nor of any thing contained therein […]. And in the event that they wanted or tried to do the contrary and did so de facto, that it would not be of any use to them or be admitted in court before any ecclesiastical or lay judge.”

(36) CORDE 1480-1484 Hernando del Pulgar, *Crónica de los Reyes Católicos*, I, 45 [19. Historical prose]: en el año siguiente del Señor de mill e quatrocientos and setenta e dos años, el príncipe y la princesa partieron […] para la villa de Alcalá de Henares. Estando allí con el arçobispo de Toledo, algunos prinçipales de la villa de Aranda de Duero, que era de la rreyna doña Juana, ovieron acuerdo de la entregar al príncipe e a la prinçesa, and de facto se la entregaron. Y luego se apoderaron della, […], e fueron echados quinientos de la villa: la justiçia e todos los otros ofiçiales que estauan puestos por la rreyna doña Juana.

“In the year of our Lord 1472, the prince and princess left […] for the town of Alcalá de Henares. While there with the archbishop of Toledo, some noblemen from the town of Aranda de Duero, which belonged to Queen Juana, agreed to hand it over to the prince and the princess, and de facto [illegally? / indeed?] they handed it over to them. Then they took control of it […], and five hundred [people] were thrown out of the town: the administrators of justice and all of the other officials that had been appointed by Queen Juana.”

This type of confirmatory structure is a prominent characteristic of some medieval prose styles. Though research on the history of Spanish genres is still much needed, it is generally agreed that the vast programme of translations of historical, scientific and statutory works initiated under the auspices of King Alphonso X (1252-1284) not only contributed to language standardisation proper, but also to the establishment of the discoursal features of a number of genres which up to that point had not existed as conventionalized text types simply because prose was not produced in the vernacular, but in Latin or Arabic. By the fifteenth century, however, if not earlier, legal and historical writings already showed clear genre-distinctive characteristics, including, among others:

a) Frequent use of connective sentence adverbs (e.g. *otrosí* ‘also, in addition’, *demás* ‘besides’) and other items making for increasing cohesiveness and referential accuracy (see Eberenz 1994: 18, Cano Aguilar 2002: 499). Note for instance in (31)-(32) above the repeated use of *dicho* ‘said’: *al dicho abat* ‘to the said abbot’, *del dicho prior* ‘of the said prior’, *el dicho valle* ‘the said valley’, *la dicha villa* ‘the said town’, etc.

b) Pairing of synonyms or near synonyms: *termino e juredicion* ‘boundary and jurisdiction’ (cf. (32)), *anulación nin receçion* ‘cancellation or rescission’ (cf. (35)), *la dicha sentençia e mandamiento* ‘the said sentence and ruling’ (cf. footnote 12).

c) Related to (b), the resort to confirmatory sentences such as those exemplified in (35)-(36).

5.4.2 *De hecho* as an epistemic sentence adverbial
In an example like (36) clause-initial *de hecho* appears to have wide (sentential) scope, so that a modern reader would feel inclined to take it in its modern, subjectivized sense of ‘indeed’ (i.e. ‘and indeed they handed it over to them’), that is, as expressing the speaker’s/writer’s commitment to the truth of the utterance. Yet the legal overtones of the passage, note especially the reference to ‘the administrators of justice’—do not allow us to rule out an interpretation of *de hecho* in its original source meaning, that is, ‘and illegally they handed it over to them’. From the fifteenth century, however, we come across examples where *de hecho* is found in confirmatory sentences in which the older, legal meaning of *de hecho* is incompatible with the overall context. This is the case, for instance, in (37)-(38) below; both passages can be identified as *switch* (Heine 2002) or *isolating* (Diewald 2002) contexts, that is, specific linguistic contexts that favour the target, more grammaticalized, meaning to the exclusion of the source meaning, so that the adverbial can only be understood as having wide scope over the clause and signalling that what was announced in prior discourse is true:

(37) CORDE 1487 Fray Hernando de Talavera, *Católica impugnación del herético libelo maldito y desconmolgado*, 189 [17. Religious prose]: También ha este necio por inconveniente, que se diga que la imagen ríe y que llora y que sudga. Verdad es que puede haber y *de hecho* hay en esto muchas burlas y mucho sacadinero, pero bien es posible que ría y lloro y yude y hable,

Also this ignorant man considers it an error saying that the statue laughs and cries and sweats. It is true that there may be and in fact there is much mockery and fraud in this matter, but it may be that [the image] smiles and cries and sweats and speaks,

(38) CORDE 1492-1493 anonymous, *Diario del primer viaje de Colón*, 173 [19. Historical prose (Diaries)]: Así que tomó por la mano el señor al escrivano y lo llevó a su casa […], y les hizo dar de comer, y todos los indios les traían muchas cosas […]. Después que fue tarde, […] ellos mismos porflavan de traellos a cuestas, y *de hecho* lo hizieron por algunos ríos y por algunos lugares lodosos.

So the chief took the official by the hand and took him to his house […], and made certain that they were fed, and all of the Indians brought them many things. When it got late, […] they [i.e. the Indians] themselves insisted on carrying them on their backs, and they indeed did so crossing some rivers and some muddy places.

Occurrences of this kind, where *de hecho* is unambiguously the sentence adverb I referred to earlier as *de hecho*<sub>Conf</sub>, are very frequent in late Medieval and Classical Spanish. The adversative sentence adverb (*de hecho*<sub>Adv</sub>) illustrated in (22)-(23) above can also be found over the same period, but is much rarer: only three or four reasonably clear instances are recorded in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The following are two of them:

(39) CORDE 1440-1460 Vasco Ramírez de Guzmán, *Jugurtha*, fol. 87r [19. Historical prose]: Jugurta […] vido quelo tentaua por las sus artes que el solia vsar Ca el le dezjan palabras de paz and *de hecho* veya que era guerra muy aspera.

Jugurtha realized that he [Metellus] was tempting him with the stratagems he used to employ for they spoke words of peace and [i.e. ‘but’] in fact he [Jugurtha] saw that it was very fierce war.

(40) CORDE 1535-1557 Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, *Historia general y natural de las Indias*, I, 297 [15. Biology]: en las sierras de Capira […] hay unos árboles hermosos e grandes que los cristianos llaman perales. Y *de hecho*, la fructa que llevan son peras en el talle y en la color, e no en más, porque el cuero es tan gordo como de un borceguí de cordobán […] e el cuesco es grande, que ocupa todo lo demás;
In the Capira mountain range [...] there are beautiful and large trees that the Christians call pear trees. And [i.e. ‘but’] in fact, the fruit that grows on them looks like pears in shape and colour, and in nothing else, because the skin is as thick as a shoe made of cordovan leather, [...] and the stone is so large that it takes up the whole fruit;

In these passages, as also in those adduced earlier to illustrate the confirmatory use of *de hecho*, the conjunction ‘and’ comes at the front of *de hecho* clause, but its meaning appears to be adversative rather than additive (see also example (23) in section 5.3), as it introduces an explicit rejection of the preceding proposition. This determines the contextual interpretation of *de hecho* itself as a strongly epistemic adverbial that could be replaced by *en realidad* ‘in reality’, but not by the more weakly epistemic *en efecto* ‘indeed’.

The adversative use of *de hecho* has become more frequent in modern times (see (42) for an eighteenth-century example). This, I suspect, could have to do with the fact that between about 1430 and 1650 the strengthened adverbial phrase *en hecho de verdad*, lit. ‘in true fact’ (< Lat. *re uera*; OLD s.v. *res* 6.b), was used very frequently with adversative function, at first in legal documents (see CORDE and Autoridades), later more generally, as in (41). Its disuse from the second half of the seventeenth century –the last example in CORDE dates from 1653– may have facilitated the increased use of *de hecho* adversatively:

(41) CORDE 1612-1625 Fray Juan Márquez, *El gobernador cristiano* [14. Didactic prose (Other texts):] Como hazía Demetrio de Efeso, que predicando san Pablo contra el ídolo de Diana, en que él tenía todo su aprovechamiento, porque labrava con gran primor la imagen, y andas de la Diosa, [...] movió una gran sedición en la ciudad, condenando a gritos la doctrina de san Pablo, con zelo al parecer de la honra de Diana, y *en hecho de verdad* por miedo de perder la grangería:

As Demetrius of Ephesus did, who, when St. Paul preached against the statue of Diana, in which he [Demetrius] had all of his economic benefits, because he carefully worked the statue, and the portable platform that carried the goddess, provoked a great public uprising in the city, condemning St. Paul’s teachings, apparently driven by his concern over the cult of Diana, but *really* out of fear of losing his trade:

(42) CORDE 1734 Benito Jerónimo Feijoo, *Teatro crítico universal*, 342 [14. Didactic prose (Treatises and essays):] Esta religiosa, que se llamaba doña Eulalia Pérez, [...] cayó en una fiebre, que pareció al médico peligrosísima (though *de hecho* it wasn’t), on account of which I was summoned to bring her spiritual relief

5.2.3 De hecho as an elaborative DM

Because of its confirmatory function with respect to a prior proposition, the sentence adverb (*de hecho*) illustrated in (37)-(38) above can be said to denote “a relationship across rather than within utterances” (Fraser and Malamud-Makowski 1996: 864; cf. section 2), and has thus both conceptual and procedural meanings. It is therefore a much more likely source than adversative *de hecho* for the use of *de hecho* as a DM signalling additivity and elaborating on the previous utterance:

(43) CORDE 1604-1618 Fray Prudencio de Sandoval, *Historia de la vida y hechos del Emperador Carlos V*, XLVI, 407 [19. Historical prose: ] [...] y se juntaron todos a tratar dello. Pero estaban tan soberbios, y por otra parte, temían tanto dejar los cargos que
tenían, principalmente los capitanes, que no se pudo acabar con ellos que quisiesen
trégua ni paz (si bien algunos de la Junta la votaron). El principal de los cuales fue don
Pedro Laso de la Vega, que desde allí les dejó y se apartó de aquel mal propósito, y de hecho se vino a Tordesillas para los gobernadores.

“[…] and everyone met to discuss the matter. But they were so arrogant, and also, they feared so much giving up the posts they held, mainly the captains, that they could not reach an agreement concerning a truce or peace (although some [members] of the ‘Junta’ voted in favour of it). The main one of which was Pedro Laso de la Vega, who from there left them and withdrew from that bad purpose, and in fact came to Tordesillas [to be] with the governors.”

(44) CORDE 1659-1664 Anonymous, Noticias de la Corte [18. Press]: [El Rey de Inglaterra] no corre bien con el Parlamento bajo, el cual le contradice con teson la libertad que desea entablar en sus reinos para la religion católica. El mismo Parlamento trata de fortificar á Tánger, y de hecho quieren enviar 10 fragatas para el efecto;

“(The King of England) does not get on well with the lower Parliament, which tenaciously opposes the freedom that he wishes to establish in his kingdoms for the Catholic religion. This same Parliament is trying to fortify Tangiers, and in fact they want to send 10 frigates for that purpose;”

(45) CORDE 1726 Benito Jerónimo Feijoo, Teatro crítico universal, I, 110 [14. Didactic prose (Treatises and essays)]: […] la regla de el Apóstol, que en la Epístola primera a los Corinthios prohibe a las mugeres hablar en la Iglesia, admite algunas excepciones: como las admite la prohibición, de que enseñen, en la Epístola primera a Timoteo: pues de hecho Priscila, compañera de el mismo Apóstol, enseñó, e instruyó a Apolo Pontico, en la Doctrina Evangélica,

“… the Apostle’s rule, who in the First Letter to the Corinthians prohibited women from speaking in Church, allows for some exceptions: as it does the prohibition that women teach in the First Letter to Timothy: for in fact Priscilla, companion of the Apostle himself, taught, and instructed Apollo Ponticus, in Evangelical Doctrine,”

Unambiguous instances of this new type are recorded from the beginning of the seventeenth century. Initially they typically occur in the by now familiar structure where y ‘and’ introduces the de hecho clause, but from 1700 onwards, when the DM becomes much more frequent, it is no longer restricted to that kind of discourse context.

6. Summary and conclusions

This section summarizes the findings of the present study in terms of the research questions introduced in section 5.1. The most obvious finding is that the historical development of de hecho is analogous to that of DMs like in fact, indeed, or actually, all of which, as pointed out earlier in this paper, started as VPAdvs and evolved into DMs via a sentence adverbial stage. A number of other items have been shown to have similar trajectories; see for instance Brinton (1999) on the development of whilom from a VPAdv meaning ‘at times’ into a SAdv meaning ‘formerly’, and from this into a DM marking the initiation of a story or episode, or Lenker (2000) on the Old English adverbs soylcle and witodlice ‘truly’, which shifted from manner adjuncts to style disjuncts and then to "indicators of thematic discontinuity" (p. 243). In Present-day Spanish the confirmatory SAdv efectivamente ‘indeed’, originally a VPAdv meaning ‘in a real manner’,17 seems to be acquiring elaborative uses comparable to those of de hecho, as in the following attested example quoted by Fuentes and Alcaide (1996: 123):
(46) [Spoken Andalusian Spanish]: Esta Navidad ha sido más cara. **Efectivamente, todo ha subido descaradamente.**

This Christmas has been more expensive. **In fact,** prices have risen exorbitantly.

With respect to *de hecho* in particular, its chronological development is a mirror image of the development of English **indeed:** in both cases the earliest uses as epistemic SAdvs date from the second half of the fifteenth century, and the earliest uses as DMs from about 1600 (see examples (37) and (43) above, and Traugott and Dasher 2002: 171). Also noteworthy is the fact that as SAdvs *de hecho* and **indeed** can be employed either adversatively, to reject a prior proposition, or to signal agreement. I showed above, however, that in terms of pragmatic motivation the confirmatory reading of *de hecho* is a much more likely source for its later use as an elaborative DM than the adversative reading, and it seems plausible that further research might reveal a similar trajectory for **indeed,** since this is attested with confirmatory meaning from a very early date. I would suggest, therefore, that elaborative DMs will often follow the correlated paths of directionality shown in Table 3, which modifies slightly Table 2 above as proposed by Traugott and Dasher (2002).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADV_manner</th>
<th>ADV_confirmatory</th>
<th>ADV_elaboration</th>
<th>ADV_hedge</th>
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<td>content</td>
<td>content/procedural</td>
<td>procedural</td>
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<td>scope within proposition</td>
<td>scope over proposition</td>
<td>scope over discourse</td>
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<td>subjective</td>
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**Table 3. Paths of directionality in the development of Spanish de hecho**

The second research question in section 5.1 addressed the issue of whether there is any morphosyntactic evidence correlating with the semantic-pragmatic changes undergone by *de hecho* which might justify an analysis in terms of grammaticalization. Clearly, when *de hecho* evolves from a VPAdv into a SAdv the shift has semantic, phonological and morphosyntactic consequences, as follows:

a) There is semantic/pragmatic change from more to less referential meaning.
b) A special intonation contour comes to be used for the SAdv.
c) The SAdv tends to appear in positions (e.g. front position in the clause) not normally occupied by VPAdvs in Spanish.
d) Unlike the VPAdv (see (47)), the SAdv is no longer eligible as the focus of a cleft sentence and cannot be questioned by *cómo* ‘how, in what way’.

d) **(47) Cómo formamos parte de Europa? ¿De hecho o de derecho?**

How do we belong in Europe? In practice or by right?

e) Coordination with other manner adverbials, as in *de hecho o de derecho* (see (47) above), or *de hecho e injustamente* ‘illegally and unjustly’ (see (32)), remains possible as long as *de hecho* is a VPAdv, but is disallowed once it has become a SAdv.

Most of the above changes are indicative of increased grammaticalization. Thus (a) illustrates desemanticization, (c) extension or context generalization, that is use in new contexts, and (d) and (e) decategorialization, or loss in the morphosyntactic properties characteristic of the source forms (see Heine 2003: 578ff for an overview of these and other interrelated mechanisms in grammaticalization). By contrast, if we now consider the further development of the SAdv *de hecho* into a DM, things are far less clear. The semantic/pragmatic shift from conceptual/procedural to procedural meaning is indeed typical of grammaticalization processes,
but the SAdv and DM uses of *de hecho* are not distinguished by intonation, and, even more importantly, they share syntactic positions. In other words, both the SAdv and the DM can occur initially, medially, or finally, and in exactly the same discourse contexts, as can be seen if we look at some of the examples quoted earlier in these pages; note in particular (20), (22), (23), (24) and (43)-(45) above, which all show that whether functioning as a SAdv or a DM, *de hecho* continues to have scope over the proposition rather than over larger discourse chunks. There are no grounds, therefore, to assume that the DM occupies a structural position distinct (i.e. further left) from that which would be assigned to the SAdv in a phrase-structural analysis, as has been suggested for the various meanings of *in fact, indeed, actually or anyway* by Traugott and her associates (see (13) above). In conclusion, as long as grammaticalization is understood as it is understood here and in Traugott’s work more generally, that is, as a process involving not only semantic/pragmatic changes but also structural and morphosyntactic ones, the confirmatory, adverative and elaborative uses of *de hecho* are better interpreted as generalized conversational implicatures (GCIs; see Levinson 2000: 11), that is, default inferences and conventions of use in language-specific communities that can be exploited to imply/insinuate certain meanings, but may however be cancelled.19

With regard to the third research question about the kinds of text-types favouring the use of *de hecho*, it has been shown in the previous pages that generic conventions may play an important role in linguistic change. Originally, Spanish *de hecho* was chiefly used in legal texts (see section 5.4.1), and the various changes affecting it are clearly associated with statutory and legal writings, and, in general, with official or semi-official documents of various kinds, including chronicles and historical prose. In the eighteenth century, when the use of *de hecho* as a DM is already well established, it is commonly found in treatises and essays such as Feijoo’s *Teatro crítico universal* (1726; see example (45)) or Ignacio de Luzán’s *Defensa de España* (1742). In terms of Biber’s multi-dimensional approach to register variation, all these kinds of texts score high for features such as informational (vs. involved) production (Dimension 1; see Biber 1988: 107), or elaborated (vs. situation-dependent) reference (Dimension 3; see Biber 1988: 110), so that, overall, Traugott and Dasher’s (2002) hypothesis (cf. section 3) that certain kinds of semantic change are not initiated by children, but by adults ‘in authoritative position’ appears to be correct. Finally, the history of *de hecho* suggests, too, that the widespread assumption that “many (indeed, presumably most) discourse markers occur first in spoken language and only gradually make their way into written texts” (Mosegaard Hansen and Rossari 2005: 181) is by no means applicable to all types of markers.

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1 Some of the material in this paper was originally prepared for a plenary lecture presented at the International Conference From Ideational to Interpersonal: Perspectives from grammaticalization (FITIGRA), held at the University of Leuven in February 2005; I would like to thank the participants in the conference for helpful discussion and the conference organizers for kindly inviting me to speak at such an intellectually rewarding event. Thanks are also due to Carla Dechant, Bruce Fraser, Tomás Jiménez Juliá, Salvador Pons Bordería, Elena Rivas, María José Rodríguez Espiñeira, Scott Schwenter, Victoria Vázquez Rozas, and the editors and anonymous reviewers for this volume. Last but not least, I am grateful for generous financial support to the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science and the European Regional Development Fund (grant HUM2007-60706/FILO), and the Autonomus Government of Galicia (INCITE grant 08PXIB204016PR).

2 Among Hispanic linguists, a similar distinction between pragmatic markers in general and a smaller subset of DMs or conectores (‘connectives’) has been made most explicitly by Fuentes Rodríguez (1994, 2001, 2003).

3 An anonymous reviewer wonders whether I hold “that DMs have purely procedural meaning and absolutely no conceptual meaning”. It is apparent throughout this chapter, however, that I adhere to the view that grammaticalized items, whether DMs, SAdvs or other, exhibit what Hopper and Traugott (2003 [1993]: 49) refer to as layering, i.e., the presence of different layers of meaning at the same time.

4 The contrast between conceptual and procedural meanings is analogous to the distinction established by Sweetser (1990) between interpretation in the content domain and interpretation in the speech-act domain, as illustrated in the following examples of causal constructions:
(i) Since John wasn’t there, we decided to leave a note for him. [His absence caused our decision in the real world.]
(ii) Since we’re on the subject, when was George Washington born? [The fact that we’re on the subject enables my act of asking the question.]

Following Sweetser (1990), Traugott and Dasher (2002: 10) use the labels “content meaning” and “contentful meaning” for Blakemore’s (1987, 2002) “conceptual meaning”, as defined in section 2 above.

An anonymous reviewer enquires about the term “adverbial hedge” used by Traugott and Dasher and how it differs from the term DM. Though the distinction is by no means clear-cut, hedges are used to convey imprecision or approximation; they encode the speaker/writer’s anticipation of the hearer/reader’s expectations and are aimed at reducing the hearer’s belief in what has just been said. In this sense, they are markers of intersubjectivity. An example would be the use of well in the sentence Yeah, we allow dogs in here; well you’ve managed to get one in anyway. For discussion of hedges see for instance Fleischman and Yaguello (2004: 134) and Lewis (2006: 46), from whom the example is taken.

The terms “elaboration” and “elaborative” go back to Halliday (1994 [1985]: 324). In fact and related DMs are members of the semantic field of expectation, and the label “DMs of expectation” is also often applied to them.

Since my concern in this paper is with the question of whether there exist structural differences between SAdv and DMs, as claimed by Traugott in many places and as more fully discussed in the next paragraphs, I will not go here into the problems posed by Tabor and Traugott’s definition of scope, which they characterize in terms of the generative notion of C-command. As Fischer (2007: 313) aptly notes, a definition of scope in such formal terms is “bound up with all kinds of theory-internal motivations’, and may therefore not be the best tool to measure scope by in research on grammaticalization.

An apparent exception to this prevailing view is Himmelmann (2004: 33). In a rather confused account of the differences between lexicalization and grammaticalization, he argues that semantic/pragmatic changes are “the core defining feature of grammaticization processes’ and that “often, but not necessarily” it will be possible to show that they are accompanied by syntactic changes.

Aissen’s E-node stands for “Expression-node”, following Banfield (1973).

Though there is no complete agreement among scholars as to when exactly one period in the history of Spanish ends and another begins, I will here adopt the more or less traditional divisions of Medieval Spanish (up to 1492, coinciding with the publication of Antonio de Nebrija’s Gramática castellana, the earliest vernacular grammar in Europe), Classical Spanish (1492-1726, where the year 1726 marks the publication of the Diccionario de Autoridades), Modern Spanish (1726 to about 1775), and Present-day Spanish. For discussion and different proposals see Eberenz (1991), Girón Alconchel (2004), and references there.

The technical restraints of CORDE and CREA make it difficult to give exact frequencies. But on average the DM use of de hecho represents about 70 percent of all instances in the spoken component of CREA.

With respect to French en fait and de fait, Roulet (1987: 125-126) points out that “Bien que certains dictionnaires, comme le Dictionnaire Larousse du français contemporain, affirment que de fait marque une relation de conformité alors que en fait marque une relation d’opposition, les deux connecteurs paraissent toujours mutuellement substituabes. […] Les interpretations de confirmation et d’opposition que donnent les dictionnaires ne sont que des effets indirects, qui ont leur source dans le contenu des constituants articulés.”

Note that in Medieval Spanish realmente was used exclusively as a manner adverb and could hence occur in coordination with other manner adverbs like bien ‘well’ (e.g. CORDE 1382 Anonymous [10. Documents and laws]: dar galardón a aquéllos que los bien e realmente sirvieron ‘reward those who served them well and in a real manner’); its use as a sentence adverb is a later development. See Corominas/Pascual (1981).

Confirmatory sentences not containing de hecho are also very common, as in the following example:

CORDE 1434 Anonymous, Autos de ejecución de sentencias del Concejo de Segura (Guipúzcoa), II, 231 [10. Documents and laws]: E luego los dichos Lope Ybannes e Lope Sanches e Juan Martines, alcaldes de la dicha Hermandat, dixieron […] que ellos como alcaldes de la dicha Hermandat, mandavan e mandaron al dicho Merino que non executase la dicha sentencia e mandamiento del dicho Pero Sarmiento.
“And afterwards the said Lope Ybannes and Lope Sanches and Juan Martines, representatives of the said citizens, said [...] that as representatives of the said citizens they had ordered and did order the said judge to not execute the said sentence and ruling against the said Pero Sarmiento”

16 For analogous developments in other European vernaculars see Fisher (1986) and Rissanen (2000).
17 Cf. Autoridades (s.v. Efectivamente), quoting Nieremberg, Varones ilustres de la Compañía de Jesús (1643-1647), lib. 2, cap.3: Que efectivamente hace en el alma lo que el alma en el cuerpo ‘Which truly affects the soul as the soul does the body.’
18 Traugott and Dasher (2002: 164) claim that the confirmatory use of indeed is found only from the sixteenth century, but some of their fifteenth-century examples, such as (14b) on p. 161, are clearly confirmatory rather than adversative.
19 Traugott and Dasher (2002: 16) refer to them as generalized invited inferences (GIINs).